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 Chapter 12 
 Political and Policy Responses to Problems 
of Inequality and Opportunity: Past, Present, 
and Future 
 Leslie  McCall 
 Abstract  There is surprisingly little research on American norms of economic 
inequality and opportunity, particularly in the era of rising inequality since the 
1980s. In this chapter, I describe three political and policy responses to problems of 
inequality and opportunity and examine how they square with public opinion. Each 
approach is characterized by a particular mix of views concerning inequality (of 
outcomes) on the one hand and opportunity on the other. The “equalizing opportu-
nity” approach places greater emphasis on equalizing opportunities than on equal-
izing outcomes, and even goes so far as opposing the equalization of outcomes in 
principle. This approach tends to be more identifi ed today with conservatives than 
with liberals, but it has had broad-based appeal for much of American history. The 
“equalizing outcomes” approach places greater emphasis on equalizing outcomes 
than on equalizing opportunity, but it embraces both. It typically sees the goal of 
equalizing opportunities as being met implicitly through government tax and trans-
fer policies that reduce disparities in disposable income. This approach is identifi ed 
strongly with liberals. The “equalizing outcomes to equalize opportunity” approach 
is the one introduced in this chapter as the most consistent with public norms today. 
It occupies the middle of the political spectrum and fuses concerns about both 
opportunity and inequality. The way forward is to eschew a one-sided focus on 
either equal outcomes or equal opportunities so that Americans’ views are better 
refl ected in both political discourse and public policy. 
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inequality •  Racial inequality •  Gender inequality •  Public opinion •  Media coverage 
•  Political campaigns •  Income redistribution •  Human capital 
 Introduction 
 Those of us who have grown up in the United States tend to have a pretty good 
handle on American culture. But for one particular aspect of American culture—
norms of  economic inequality and  opportunity —there may be more than fi rst meets 
the eye. Indeed, relatively little research exists on this subject, particularly in the era 
of rising inequality since the 1980s. Without such research, we naturally fall back 
on our social antennae, which are not likely to be reliable given the necessarily lim-
ited scope of our experiences and networks. Add to this that many commentators 
inhabit relatively elite positions in society (e.g., professors, journalists, pollsters, 
and politicians), and the result is often a chasm between elite and public understand-
ings of the issue. This is  not a chasm that characterizes only one side of the political 
aisle, however. 
 In this chapter, I describe three political and policy responses to problems of 
inequality and opportunity and examine how they square with public opinion about 
the topic. Each approach is characterized by a particular mix of views concerning 
the two related issues of opportunity and inequality (of outcomes).
•  “ Equalizing opportunity ”: This approach not only places greater emphasis on 
equalizing opportunities than on equalizing outcomes, it pits one against the 
other and actively opposes equalizing outcomes as a policy objective. This 
approach tends to be more identifi ed today with conservatives than with liberals, 
but it has had broad-based appeal over the long course of American history and 
is considered by many to be the dominant ideology of the nation. 
•  “Equalizing outcomes” : This approach, at the other end of the spectrum, places 
greater emphasis on equalizing outcomes than on equalizing opportunity but 
embraces both. It typically sees the goal of equalizing opportunities as being met 
implicitly through government tax and transfer policies that reduce disparities in 
disposable income. This approach is identifi ed strongly with liberals. 
•  “Equalizing outcomes to equalize opportunity” : This approach occupies the mid-
dle of the spectrum,  fusing notions of opportunity and inequality. A central argu-
ment of this chapter is that it has emerged as an alternative to the previous two 
approaches, which have been the dominant forces historically but have important 
limitations in our present era. This middle approach also has illuminating roots 
in history, where equalizing outcomes had become the strategy of last resort in 
the battle to equalize opportunities across race and gender. In this approach, the 
job market and educational institutions are the focus of a joint strategy to equal-
ize outcomes and opportunities, in contrast to the “equalizing outcomes” 
approach that emphasizes government tax and transfer policies. Among elites, 
this approach is more identifi ed with liberals than with conservatives, but I argue 
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that it potentially has broader popular support among the general public, as well 
as among elites, with new possibilities that have yet to fully crystalize. 
 These approaches have not developed in a strictly chronological fashion over 
time; nor do they overlap precisely onto partisan orientations. Nevertheless, as I 
hope will become clear, there are good reasons to organize the discussion along the 
lines of the past, present, and future, and to roughly categorize these approaches 
along a continuum of partisan and political ideology, as indicated above. However, 
it is crucial to keep in mind that partisan boundaries are undergoing shifts and are 
not necessarily identical for elites and the general public. 
 The Legacy of the Past 
 But America is more than just a place … it’s an idea. It’s the only country founded on an idea. 
Our rights come from nature and God, not government. We promise  equal opportunity, not 
equal outcomes . 
 – Paul Ryan’s speech upon becoming Mitt Romney’s running mate (Norfolk, VA, August 
11, 2012, emphasis added) 
 It has long been an article of faith that what Americans stand for is equality of 
opportunity and not equality of outcomes. Relative to their European counterparts, 
Americans are considered “exceptional” in this regard: Europeans place greater 
emphasis on equality of outcomes, achieved through government policies that redis-
tribute income, provide access to health care and retirement security, and protect the 
right to bargain for higher wages and other workplace benefi ts. By contrast, 
Americans emphasize the importance of individual responsibility and freedom from 
government intervention. They seek to level the playing fi eld so anyone can succeed 
no matter their economic or social background (Lipset  1996 ). In terms of  govern-
ment policy , this has translated into a commitment to expand access to education. 
The U.S. was a pioneer of compulsory schooling, general and college preparatory 
curricula for all students, and the expansion of higher education, fi rst through the 
“high school for all movement” and second through the strategy of providing “col-
lege for all” (Goldin and Katz  2008 ; Rosenbaum  2001 ). 
 Although often not associated with government policy per se, another central 
vehicle in the achievement of equality of opportunity in the United States has been 
robust economic growth. It would hardly suffi ce to educate a population for ever- 
higher- skilled jobs if such jobs were few in number; thus, educational and employ-
ment opportunity go hand in hand. The contrast between the U.S. and Europe in this 
respect was especially stark during the postwar period in which economic growth 
was both swift and equitably distributed in the U.S. (Levy  1987 ). Europe, by 
 comparison, was recovering and rebuilding in the aftermath of war and relied on 
direct government aid and the expansion of the welfare state to do so, often with 
pressure from labor parties. Although many of the welfare state functions that were 
instituted in Europe were simultaneously deployed in the U.S., they were imple-
mented through the back door here, so to speak, with government subsidies given to 
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employers who then furnished  health-care and  retirement benefi ts to their employ-
ees. The hidden nature of these subsidies meant that government was rarely associ-
ated with, or given credit for, the ensuing benefi ts (Strasser et al.  1998 ; Howard 
 1997 ). This only reinforced the image of the United States as the land of unfettered 
economic opportunity, an image that dates back at least to  Alexis de Tocqueville ’s 
 Democracy in America . 
 This approach, then, is what I will call the “equal opportunity” approach, along 
the lines of  Paul Ryan’s quotation at the top of this section. It rests politically on a 
combination of government policies and an economic environment that together 
created educational and employment opportunities for a broad swath of the 
American population. Direct government redistribution is notably and often explic-
itly absent from this picture. 
 Nonetheless, there would always be those for whom the land of opportunity was 
beyond reach. For these individuals, a set of safety net programs has been in place 
since the  New Deal . These programs have a contested history, but by and large they 
were expanded throughout the postwar decades. Their two-tiered structure—one 
means-tested serving low-income populations (e.g.,  “welfare” and food stamps) and 
one universal (e.g.,  Social Security )—remains in place. However, the means-tested 
programs, and particularly income support, became increasingly conditional on the 
requirement to work, circling back to the notion that opportunities for gainful 
employment are ultimately a better remedy for economic hardship than transfers of 
income are. 
 As important in the struggle for inclusion, especially by those who had been 
explicitly and legally denied a piece of the American pie, were policies that regu-
lated equal access to educational institutions and the labor market. Here, too, the 
U.S. was a pioneer in developing strategies that expanded economic and educa-
tional opportunities, this time to those groups that had been discriminated against by 
virtue of their race/ethnicity, gender, or both. In the face of resistance to integration 
by employers and White workers, however, the anti-discrimination approach proved 
insuffi cient on its own.  Affi rmative action policies were then enacted to ensure a fair 
representation of women and minorities in universities and the workplace (MacLean 
 2006 ). This ignited a debate—perhaps more explicit than ever before—between the 
“equal opportunities” (i.e., anti-discrimination) and “equal outcomes” (i.e., affi rma-
tive action) strategies. Arguably, this opposition spilled over into discussions of the 
terms of government-provided income support to the poor, given the racial identifi -
cation of the poor as African-American by the majority White population. Assistance 
that was directed toward creating employment opportunities was therefore consid-
ered more acceptable—and enjoyed greater popular support—than cash support. 
 The debate between these two opposing strategies continues to this day, as 
refl ected in Ryan’s fi rst vice presidential campaign speech. It is critical, however, to 
recognize the broader resonance of the “equal opportunities” approach; it should 
not be seen as a dictum of only one of the two parties. As I will show in the next 
section, when  President Obama began placing greater emphasis on the issue of 
 income inequality in late 2011, Independent and Democratic leaning commentators 
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worried that the message would appeal only to a narrow base of party activists and 
alienate the majority of Americans who, they argued, cared more about opportunity 
than inequality. And the establishment of a genuinely open opportunity society 
would require many of the policies that Democrats endorse in both the “equal out-
comes” and “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities” approaches, as also will 
become clear in subsequent sections. 
 But before turning to the present, and to what we know about how Americans 
think about such issues, I want to underline three features of past debates that have 
important implications for how we think about current and future debates. 
 First, the original struggle for inclusion by African-Americans, other racial 
minorities, and women was premised on fundamental rights of equality, but it was 
also premised on the vitality of the economy, the ongoing expansion of a high- 
quality educational system, and the equitable nature of both. Living standards rose 
in absolute terms across the income distribution,  and relative differences among 
income groups declined. However, once the foundation of shared prosperity began 
to crack in the era of stagfl ation (1970s and 1980s), a more overtly zero-sum politics 
gained ascendancy, amplifying the tension between opportunities and outcomes and 
reinforcing popular opposition to outcomes-based measures such as affi rmative 
action and welfare. 
 Second, and related, is that the “equal opportunities” approach arose, paradoxi-
cally, during a period in which outcomes were actually becoming more equal. This 
prompts the question of whether equitable outcomes were (and are) an implicit part 
of the defi nition or perception of an equal opportunity society. One example that 
suggests that they are is affi rmative action, which equalized (occupational and edu-
cational) outcomes  as a way to enforce equal opportunity policies. Indeed, affi rma-
tive action is considered an equal opportunity policy. More generally, racial and 
gender gaps in test scores, graduation rates, and occupational employment—that is, 
measures of inequality of outcomes—are frequently employed to symbolize the 
lack of equal educational and employment opportunities. When this happens, 
unequal outcomes function as indicators of unequal opportunities, and equal out-
comes function as gateways to equal opportunities (Young  1958 ; Bell  1973 ; Roemer 
 1998 ). In the next section, I will refer to this approach as the middle-ground “equal-
ize outcomes to equalize opportunities” approach. 
 Finally, the “equal opportunities” approach was put in place at a time when the 
goal was to rectify  racial and  gender inequalities and to ameliorate the conditions of 
the poor. It was not put in place to address the kind of economic inequality that we 
are encountering today, nor the targeting of the top “1 percenters” that this has 
entailed. Thus, part of the opposition to an “equal outcomes” approach may have 
been the result of opposition to the “undeserving” poor, racial and/or gender equal-
ity, or heightened economic anxieties that exacerbated intergroup competition, 
rather than to an “equal outcomes” approach  per se . In other words, an “equal out-
comes” approach—untethered from past associations in a postwelfare reform era—
may be more palatable today or in the future. 
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 All of this is to say that the “equal opportunities” approach is more nuanced, and 
even more internally contradictory, than commonly thought. 1 In practice, the 
achievement of equal opportunities is intertwined in important respects with the 
achievement of more equitable outcomes, particularly in the postwar period when 
contemporary norms of equality were given shape. And the slogan of “equal oppor-
tunities” may prove malleable in the face of new confi gurations of inequality as we 
go forward. 
 The Present Era of Rising Inequality 
 The growing income gap has become the central issue in American politics. 
 – “Income Gap is Issue No. 1, Debaters Agree,”  Washington Post , December 7, 1995 
 [C]orporate profi ts are setting records… [b]ut the real average hourly wage is fi ve percent 
lower than it was a decade ago. 
 –  Robert Dole , eventual Republican nominee,  New York Times , February 14, 1996 
 If Americans care about “equal opportunities” and not “equal outcomes,” how 
did we arrive at a point in the mid-1990s when Republican candidates—including 
Robert Dole, quoted above, as well as  Patrick Buchanan —were stumping openly 
about the growing divide in economic fortunes (Ladd and Bowman  1998 ; Jacoby 
 1997 )? And what happened to the preoccupation with opportunity? In this section, 
I bring public opinion to bear on these questions. Even though Americans may be 
more sensitized to issues of inequality now than in the past, both  public opinion data 
and  media coverage reveal that they were attuned to it in the 1990s as well. As I 
describe below, a majority of Americans have in fact expressed a desire for less 
inequality since at least the late 1980s. The preference for a more equitable distribu-
tion of income cannot, therefore, be attributed only to recent media and political 
attention to the topic, as is often assumed. 
 Proceeding from this baseline, my goal in this section is twofold. In an effort to 
better understand exactly  how the public thinks about inequalities of both outcomes 
and opportunities, I fi rst provide a brief overview of the best available survey data 
on attitudes about  income inequality , perceptions of  executive and worker pay and 
 pay gaps , and beliefs about the role of individual responsibility and structural fac-
tors in shaping opportunities to “get ahead” (as the survey questions put it). I also 
describe the ways in which views about income inequality are interconnected 
with—rather than counterposed to—views about economic opportunity, as well as 
the consequences this has for policy preferences. Second, I discuss how, beginning 
as early as the late 1980s and culminating in the 2012 presidential election,  inequality 
and opportunity became more explicitly interconnected in elite discourses as well, 
fi rst among journalists and then among politicians. Recalling the second approach 
1  And in this respect parallels the contradictory nature of “American Dream” ideology (Hochschild 
 1995 ). 
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introduced above, this has led to a new set of narratives about problems of  inequality 
and opportunity, as well as to a corresponding set of new policy proposals to address 
such problems. 
 Before discussing the content of public opinion, however, it is worth saying a few 
words about the primary source of public opinion data that informs my analyses. 
The best available information comes from the  General Social Survey . The GSS was 
devised in the early 1970s to chronicle everything from religious beliefs to family 
formation practices to priorities for government spending. However, coverage of 
attitudes concerning inequality and opportunity was thin, and what did exist focused 
on subjects that were topical at that time, namely poverty and gender and racial 
inequality (as discussed in the previous section). As a result, the time series of pub-
lic opinion data reported in this section begins in 1987, when the international coun-
terpart to the GSS, the  International Social Survey Program , introduced its fi rst 
 Social Inequality Module , which was incorporated into all of the participating 
country- level surveys. The module was then replicated in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2008, 
2010, and 2012. (In 1996, 2008, and 2012, the modules were only partially repli-
cated and only in the U.S.) 
 It should be underscored that none of the longest running and most respected 
surveys in the United States or elsewhere have ever contained a detailed battery of 
relevant questions on a routine basis. This is indicative, I would suggest, of the 
extent to which these topics constitute a new domain of inquiry, and one that was 
perhaps so taken for granted that it failed to inspire rigorous investigation until only 
recently. 2 In the past decade, however, a number of relevant survey questions have 
been fi elded and I will draw on these in my discussion as well. In particular, wher-
ever possible, I will compare public views to those of economic elites taking part in 
a representative pilot survey of the top wealth holders in the Chicago area conducted 
by Benjamin Page and colleagues (the Survey of Economically Successful 
 Americans , or SESA). 3 This survey replicated many of the questions on inequality 
and opportunity found in the GSS. 
 Public Beliefs About Inequality and Opportunity 
 To begin with attitudes toward income inequality, Fig.  12.1 plots trends over time in 
responses to the only three questions about income inequality that have been repli-
cated in each of the survey years mentioned above. The most straightforward of the 
three questions asks respondents’ feelings as to whether “income differences in 
America are too large.” This question solicits agreement or strong agreement by a 
substantial majority of Americans today—roughly two-thirds. Desires for less 
inequality are also consistently high over time, a trend that supports the claim that I 
2  In the pre-rising-inequality era, see, e.g., Hochschild ( 1981 ), Kluegel and Smith ( 1986 ), and 
Vanneman and Cannon ( 1987 ) for in-depth studies of beliefs about inequality. 
3  Page et al.  2013 . Analyses of the SESA data are taken from McCall and Chin ( 2013 ). 
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made earlier about the timing and cause of opposition to inequality. American oppo-
sition to inequality is not primarily a fl eeting consequence of social movement 
activism or political leadership, as it predates episodes such as the  Occupy Wall 
Street movement and President Obama’s seizing upon the issue in his 2012 reelec-
tion campaign.
 Nonetheless, attitudes do shift over time in revealing ways. According to the bot-
tom two lines in Fig.  12.1 , a majority of Americans agree or strongly agree with two 
specifi c statements about the ill  effects of the income gap . In 2012, between 55 and 
65 % of Americans believed that the benefi ts of inequality are neither widely shared 
(in response to a question whether “inequality continues to exist because it benefi ts 
the rich and powerful”) nor strictly required to create the kinds of incentives that 
fuel economic growth and prosperity (in response to a question whether “large dif-
ferences in income are not necessary for prosperity”). These skeptical  attitudes 
toward inequality exhibit a clear peak in the mid-1990s and again in the most recent 
survey year of 2012, relative to the base year of 1987 and also relative to a dip in 
concerns in 2000. 4 This pattern will help in deciphering how Americans connect 
perceptions of economic opportunity to perceptions of income inequality, a subject 
to which I will return at the end of my review of the public opinion data. 
 Turning to the topic of disparities in pay (rather than income), public opinion 
polls since at least the 1970s refl ect widespread opposition to CEO pay, with well 
4  Moreover, the peaks are strongly signifi cant after controlling for a large number of compositional 
and political shifts, such as polarization in partisan views, which I discuss further below and in 















Income differences are too large
Inequality continues to exist to benefit rich and powerful
Large income differences are unnecessary for prosperity
Agree and
strongly agree
 Fig. 12.1  American concerns about inequality, 1987–2012 (Source: Author’s analysis of the 
General Social Survey. Notes: Response categories also include “neither agree nor disagree,” “dis-




over two-thirds of Americans saying CEOs are overpaid. 5 Based on data that are of 
higher quality than polls but more infrequent, Americans are also generally aware of 
(1) the rise in executive pay, (2) the stagnation of worker pay, and (3) the widening 
of pay disparities. For instance, the ratio between the median estimate of executive 
pay and worker pay more than doubles from 13:1 in 2000 to 32:1 in 2010, as shown 
in Fig.  12.2 . Although these ratios signifi cantly understate the dramatic increase in 
earnings inequality, the median desired ratio is still remarkably low—4:1 in 2000 
and 7:1 in 2010—and also dwarfed by the median desired ratio among the top 1 %, 
which is 50:1. It is therefore unlikely that preferences for less inequality would be 
substantially altered by a more accurate appraisal of the scale of executive pay, 
because they are already so low (see McCall and Chin  2013 , Table 3, for a more in-
depth analysis of this point). Among the general public, knowledge of growing pay 
inequality is also driven by dramatically higher estimates of executive pay rather 
than by signifi cantly lower estimates of worker pay. In fact, it is evident to most 
Americans that worker pay has been largely stagnant for the past couple of decades.
 Despite knowledge of rising inequality and desires for a more equitable distribu-
tion of both income and earnings, do Americans nevertheless maintain their faith—
perhaps blindingly so—in the land of opportunity? On the one hand, as Fig.  12.3 
shows, over 90 % of Americans, including the top 1 %, do indeed believe that hard 
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 Fig. 12.2  American perceptions of occupational pay and pay inequality (Source: Author’s analy-
sis of the General Social Survey, the International Social Survey Program, and the Survey of 
Economically Successful Americans. Note: Data are in current (non-infl ation-adjusted) dollars. 
Median estimates are presented (e.g., median estimated pay and median desired pay) and ratios of 
these estimates are taken) 
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work is essential or very important in getting ahead. This is, predictably, greater 
than the median among advanced industrial countries, which is nonetheless quite 
high itself at 73 %. On the other hand, there is a little known countervailing ten-
dency: Americans are generally as or more likely to believe in the role of social 
factors in getting ahead, such as having well-educated parents, coming from a 
wealthy family, and knowing the right people. And the American public at large is 
also at least twice as likely to express these views as the top 1 percenters are. In fact, 
only 1 percent of the top 1 percenters said that coming from a wealthy family was 
very important, whereas 31 % of the public did. The American public therefore 
emerges as signifi cantly more cognizant of social barriers to getting ahead than 
economic elites do.
 Although these particular data also suggest that recognition of barriers to upward 
mobility is increasing over time (not shown), a few more frequently repeated ques-
tions give us greater purchase on this trend. Perhaps the single best question asks 
whether “people like me and my family have a good chance of improving our stan-
dard of living” (see Fig.  12.4 ). Interestingly, when concerns about inequality are at 
their highest in the early and mid-1990s, and again in the most recent survey years 
(see Fig.  12.1 ), Americans are  less likely to agree that their standard of living will 



























Parent's Coming from a Knowing the
education...                wealthy family... right people...
is essential/very important for getting ahead (%)
Hard work is essential/very important for getting ahead (%)
 Fig. 12.3  American and international perceptions of economic opportunity (Source: Author’s 
analysis of the General Social Survey [2010; U.S. Public], the International Social Survey Program 
[2010, ISSP Median], and the Survey of Economically Successful Americans [2011, US Top 1 %]. 
Notes: Other response categories for GSS and ISSP are “somewhat important,” “not very impor-
tant,” and “not at all important.” Response categories for SESA include “very important,” “some-
what important,” and “not very important at all,” and therefore only “very important” is shown in 
the chart. Only other advanced industrial countries are included in the calculation of the ISSP 
median, including Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Iceland, 




55 % were optimistic about their chances for upward mobility. This is more than 20 
percentage points off the high point of optimism in 2000, when 77 % agreed. 
(Agreement was also high, at 73 %, at the start of our time series in 1987.) Similarly, 
Gallup began asking a question in 2001 about the degree to which people are satis-
fi ed with “the opportunity for a person in this nation to get ahead by working hard.” 
As shown in Fig.  12.5 , they found that satisfaction has been falling ever since this 
question was launched, from 76 % in 2001 to 53 % in 2012.
 The fact that heightened concerns about inequality coincide with greater pessi-
mism about the possibility for upward mobility can be further seen in Fig.  12.6 , 
which helps to illuminate how the various strands of public opinion that we have 
been discussing fi t together. 
 On the left side, the fi gure charts the trend in an index of concerns about inequal-
ity that includes all three questions in Fig.  12.1 (income differences are too large; 
inequality continues to exist to benefi t the rich and powerful; large income differ-
ences are unnecessary for property) scaled from 0 to 1, so that the y-axis indicates 
the proportionate increase from 1987 in concerns about inequality after controlling 
for a wide range of factors. When the vertical lines for each year are above the line 
at 0, it means that concerns are signifi cantly greater than they were in 1987. The red 
squares show the shift in concerns when not controlling for the trend in concerns 
about upward mobility from Fig.  12.4 ; the blue diamonds show the trend when 
controlling for it.
 What we fi nd is that the blue diamonds are almost always below the red squares, 

















Agree and strongly agree
Disagree and strongly disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
"The way things are in America, people like me and my family have a good chance 
of improving our standard of living."
 Fig. 12.4  Changes in perceptions of economic opportunity, 1987–2012 (Source: Author’s analy-
sis of the General Social Survey) 
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cerns about upward mobility had not done so. That is because the two trends are 
correlated: rising concerns about upward mobility help to “explain” rising concerns 
about inequality. Except for measures of political ideology and partisanship, no 
other single variable has as large an effect. 
 And as can be seen with a similar exercise on the right side of chart, the effect of 
the trend in political orientation is in the opposite direction: concerns about inequal-
ity would have risen even more (as shown by the blue triangles above the red 
squares) had the trend in political orientation not veered in a more conservative 
direction over this period, inhibiting the rise in concerns about inequality. In other 
words, concerns about both inequality and opportunity rose substantially over time, 
in a coordinated fashion, against the tide of the more remarked-upon trend toward 
political conservatism, which slowed the rise in concerns to only a minor degree 
relative to the largely unexplained portion of the shifts. 
 This conclusion is reinforced by an analysis of other trends that fail to coincide 
with heightened desires for less inequality. Take, for example, two factors often 
assumed to be associated with rising concerns about inequality: the growing trend 
in inequality itself and the business cycle. From both Figs.  12.1 and  12.6 , we can see 
that concerns about inequality do not peak during the trough of a business cycle and 
then taper off; instead, they stabilize or rise during the initial years of recovery from 
a recession—in the mid-1990s and in 2012. This is the case even though other pub-
lic opinion data (e.g., from the American National Election Studies) clearly show an 
upswing in Americans’ assessments of how the national economy is performing 

















t % very/somewhat satisfied
How satisfied are you with "the opportunity for a person in
this nation to get ahead by working hard"?
 Fig. 12.5  Changes in perceptions of economic opportunity, 2001–2012 (Source: Gallup. Notes: 




shifts). 6 Similarly, concerns about both inequality and opportunities for upward 
mobility subsided during the boom years of the late 1990s, despite most measures 
of inequality not falling in lockstep, or even continuing to rise. 7 
 Taking these and other considerations into account, I fi nd that the peaks of 
concern about inequality emerge with perceptions of the negative  consequences of 
inequality—its practical impact on economic opportunity—rather than with 
6  According to the  American National Election Studies (ANES) , in 2008, 90 % of respondents said 
the economy was worse than the year before, whereas 36 % said so in 2012. Most Americans are 
aware that the economy is improving or at least not getting any worse. The diverging pattern of 
views about the economy and distribution of income are also apparent in the aftermath of the early 
2000s recession (McCall  2013 , 170–172, based on ANES data). 
7  The trend in inequality is complex and depends on the part of the distribution in which it is mea-
sured; thus we need to examine both the actual trends and the trends that the public is most likely 



























Model includes all controls except focal variable(s)
Plus Focal Variable: Plus Focal Variables:
Mobility Optimism Political Ideology,partisanship
 Fig. 12.6  Adjusted trend in index of concerns about inequality (scaled 0–1) (Source: Author’s 
analysis of the General Social Survey. Notes: The outcome is an index of the three questions in 
Fig.  12.1 , scaled to range from 0 to 1 (income differences are too large; inequality continues to 
exist to benefi t the rich and powerful; large income differences are unnecessary for prosperity). All 
models include controls for factors that were found to affect beliefs about inequality, including age 
(and age squared), household size and whether the respondent has children under 18, marital status 
(married/nonmarried), region (South/non-South), race (White/non-White), employment status 
(employed/nonemployed), subjective social class, family income, and education. Mobility opti-
mism is measured by the variable presented in Fig.  12.4 . Political orientation is measured with two 
variables on a seven-point scale: political ideology (liberal to conservative) and partisanship 
(Democrat to Republican). These are also interacted with year where appropriate (in 1996, 2010, 
and 2012)) 
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 perceptions of the  level of inequality itself. The fact that perceptions of restricted 
opportunities endure past the offi cial end of recessions, as is evident in both the 
early 1990s and late 2000s, suggests that Americans are seeking something more 
than mere economic growth to alleviate their economic anxieties. During the “job-
less” recoveries of late, in which wages have also stagnated, Americans are reacting 
against patterns of inequitable growth, in which only the top is experiencing gains 
and the  American Dream of shared prosperity is thrown into question. Put some-
what differently, I am suggesting that if the economy were doing well today for 
everyone—if all boats were lifted and economic opportunity abounded—concerns 
about inequality would decline despite what some consider to be stratospheric lev-
els of inequality. In my discussion of  media coverage ,  political campaigns , and 
policy preferences in the next section, I provide additional evidence of this dynamic 
and further fl esh out its details and policy implications. 
 To sum up, most Americans desire less inequality and have for at least a quarter 
of a century. Also, by some measures, intolerance of inequality is increasing and is 
signifi cantly higher today than it was 25 years ago. Regarding matters of opportu-
nity, many Americans recognize that social barriers to opportunity are important, 
even more so than in similar countries, and much more so than the top 1 percenters 
do. And, again, by some measures, such perceptions of limited opportunities have 
increased over the past decade. Lastly, and, most centrally, concerns about restricted 
opportunities appear to coincide with desires for less inequality. This blending of 
perceptions of inequalities of opportunity and outcomes recalls the discussion of the 
middle-ground “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunity” approach at the end of 
the previous section. 
 Elite Discourses of Inequality and Opportunity 
 Although both the content and overall sophistication of public views may be sur-
prising, what is perhaps even more surprising are repeated allusions to the “equalize 
outcomes to equalize opportunity” approach at several junctures throughout the 
period of rising inequality by journalists and politicians. In addition to the quota-
tions appearing at the top of this section—pinpointing the central role of inequality 
in the 1996 presidential election—journalists were linking news about growing eco-
nomic inequality to the potential eclipse of the American Dream as early as the 
1980s. Although these formulations and slogans may not have been as frequent or 
as well articulated in political platforms as they are today, they nonetheless offer 
insight into the tacit ways in which Americans, including elites, fuse their practical 
understandings of opportunity and inequality. 
 In this section, I fi rst briefl y illustrate how this fusion of ideas is depicted in 
media coverage. For our purposes, the widespread prevalence of this particular 
framing is less signifi cant than the almost commonsensical appeal of the framing 
itself across partisan perspectives. Then, for the remainder of the section, I focus on 
the current political scene, including a discussion of the political and economic 
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strategies for reducing inequality and expanding opportunity that have surfaced in 
recent political debates and the policy orientation of the public at large. 
 For close to three decades, editorialists  Mortimer Zuckerman of  U.S. News & 
World Report and  Robert Samuelson of  Newsweek have been two of the most stal-
wart commentators on issues of inequality and opportunity from the liberal and 
conservative perspectives, respectively. Already in 1988, Zuckerman had written a 
column in response to a report on inequality released by the  Congressional Budget 
Offi ce (July 25). Bemoaning the effects of inequality, in which “most of our citizens 
have not benefi tted from recent U.S. prosperity,” Zuckerman related the new devel-
opments to the upcoming presidential election, arguing that “the crucial judgment is 
who can reverse the trends toward inequality and bring more of our people closer to 
the American dream.” According to Zuckerman, growth was no longer a guarantor 
of the kinds of economic opportunities Americans had come to expect, and widen-
ing inequality was the reason why. Fast-forwarding almost two decades ahead, in a 
2006 column titled “Trickle-Up Economics” (October 2), Samuelson similarly cas-
tigated the skewed nature of economic growth as “un-American” and a threat to 
“America’s social compact, which depends on a shared sense of well-being.” As an 
indication of just how routinely journalists had been covering these issues,  Justin 
Fox of  Time complained in an article written in 2008 that the income gap is “an 
issue that’s been danced around for too long. It’s time to address it” (May 26). 
 Thus issue fatigue among journalists had already arrived some six months before 
Barack Obama’s victory in the presidential election of that year and a full 3½ years 
before his fi rst major speech on the subject in December 2011—in Osawatamie, 
Kansas—itself just a few months after the eruption of the Occupy Wall Street move-
ment. The issue had long been percolating in the media as well as in prior electoral 
campaigns (in the 1990s) by the time it was the focus of a major social movement 
and then elevated to the highest level of political expression in the words of the 
president himself. 
 Despite this, Obama’s emphasis on inequality in the fi rst major domestic policy 
speech of his 2012 reelection campaign (in Osawatamie), and then again in his 2012 
State of the Union address, was not wholeheartedly embraced by independents or 
pundits and strategists within the wider fold of the Democratic Party. The dispute 
was nicely encapsulated in an op-ed by the nonpartisan head of the  Pew Opinion 
Research Center ,  Andrew Kohut , who warned that “what the public wants is not a 
war on the rich but more politics that promote opportunity.” Another analyst argued 
that “a campaign emphasizing growth and opportunity is more likely to yield a 
Democratic victory than is a campaign focused on inequality. While the latter will 
thrill the party’s base, only the former can forge a majority.” 8 In short, the “equal 
opportunities” approach was not only very much alive, but it appealed to opinion 
leaders across the political spectrum, to the center and left as well as to the more 
predictable right. 
8  Andrew Kohut, “Don’t Mind the Gap,”  New York Times, January 27, 2012; William Galston, 
“Why Obama’s New Populism May Sink His Campaign,”  New Republic , December 17, 2011. 
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 Yet, in truth, Obama was careful to embed his comments on inequality within a 
more expansive rhetoric about the need to repair and rebuild the American Dream. 
His diagnosis followed in the vein of journalists like Zuckerman and Samuelson, 
who saw inequality as a barrier to opportunity in the form of shared prosperity and 
equitable growth. Given the obligation of journalists to have their fi nger on the pulse 
of ordinary Americans, this rendering echoed public views, in which heightened 
concerns about inequality coincided with growing pessimism about the chances for 
upward mobility (as discussed above). That is, the president’s vision was more con-
sistent with the “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities” approach, where both 
inequality and opportunity took center stage, than it was with another approach—an 
exclusively “equal outcomes” approach—that  substituted an emphasis on inequality 
for one on opportunity, as those reacting against the president’s speeches had 
claimed. The misinterpretation was understandable, however, in that attention to 
“equal outcomes” has a venerable history among liberals and still enjoys substantial 
backing, for example, in frequent calls to increase taxes on the affl uent as the cen-
terpiece of an anti-inequality agenda (Piketty  2014 ). 
 This brings us to a key question: How do these various approaches translate into 
policy prescriptions? It is one thing for various publics and leaders to coalesce 
around the defi nition of the problem but quite another to fi nd common ground on 
the solution. After briefl y describing the advantages and disadvantages of the poli-
cies associated with the more familiar “equal opportunities” and “equal outcomes” 
approaches, I focus on the policies that have evolved in response to the perspective 
that, in the public’s mind, I argue, best characterizes our era of rising inequality, that 
is, the “equalizing outcomes to equalize opportunities” perspective. Although these 
policies overlap in several respects with those of the other two approaches, they are 
also venturing into largely uncharted territory. 
 As should be transparent by now, the key strength of the “equal opportunities” 
approach is its emphasis on equalizing opportunities, whereas its key weakness is 
its rejection of any attempt to  directly reduce inequalities of outcomes. On the one 
hand, the prescription of pro-business reforms to accelerate economic growth in 
conjunction with educational reforms to reward individual responsibility is a win-
ning combination. It reassures the public in its promise to create precisely the kinds 
of job opportunities required to lift oneself up by the bootstraps to achieve the 
American Dream of upward mobility, and, in doing so, it harkens back to the Golden 
Age of postwar prosperity and educational expansion. To the extent that Republicans 
are more closely identifi ed with this message than Democrats are, they reap the 
political benefi ts of an economic opportunity platform (Smith  2007 ). 
 On the other hand, in our own post-postwar era, a prescription of economic 
growth alone does little to correct the skew toward the top in the availability of good 
employment opportunities. This weakness in the “equal opportunities” approach 
may become even more salient as  household incomes in the middle of the distribu-
tion continue their historic slide from peaks at the turn of the twenty-fi rst century. 
The last business cycle (2000–2007) was the fi rst in which median household 
income and female earnings both failed to post signifi cant gains (whereas median 
male earnings stopped growing in the 1970s) (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor  2014 ). 
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Long the country with the “richest” middle class, the U.S. now lags Canada in 
median after-tax income levels. 9 
 The resulting dynamic could parallel that of the 1960s and 1970s, when anti- 
discrimination policies were insuffi cient in reducing inequality in the face of resis-
tance to gender and racial integration by White workers and employers, which then 
provoked the more proactive approach of “equalizing outcomes to equalize oppor-
tunities” (i.e., affi rmative action). Indeed, some in the “equal opportunities” camp 
are afraid that a populist backlash against inequality could usher forth a more drastic 
leveling of incomes than proactive initiatives. And this has led to a reconsideration 
of the implicit ban on advocacy of outcomes-based policies, such as raising the 
minimum wage and the earned income tax credit. To be sure, a resuscitation of the 
“compassionate conservative” in the present day may entail more attention to equal-
izing opportunities than equalizing outcomes, but the latter is beginning to be 
acknowledged in the process. 10 
 Although most Democrats endorse an economic growth strategy (there is little 
reason for anyone not to), and Democratic administrations are in fact more likely to 
implement policies that deliver middle-income growth, they are more closely iden-
tifi ed with the “equal outcomes” than with the “equal opportunities” approach, for 
the simple reason that they do indeed advocate for more equal outcomes (Bartels 
 2008 ; Kelly  2009 ). As is well known, this approach traditionally focuses on 
increased taxes on the affl uent as the principal method of ameliorating economic 
hardship and mitigating economic inequality. 
 On the one hand, the prescription of increased taxes on the wealthy is reassuring 
to the public in its emphasis on diverting funds from those who do not need them to 
those who do. On the other hand, there’s a fairly severe transparency problem that 
handicaps this strategy: exactly how are higher taxes on the rich going to translate 
into greater educational and job opportunities for the rest of the population? On the 
basis of what history are Americans to put their trust in taxing the rich as the solu-
tion to declining opportunities? While in principle popular support for progressive 
taxes is often fairly high—above the 50 % mark—such support is fi ckle in the 
moment, when it comes to specifi c pieces of legislation, because the benefi ts are 
often not clearly conveyed. As  Larry Bartels has shown, the public will opt for a 
small tax cut for themselves even if they perceive the well off as receiving an unfair 
and disproportionate share of the gains from tax-cut legislation, as was the case in 
2001 for support of the Bush tax cuts (Bartels  2005 ; Lupia et al.  2007 ). 
 Interestingly, the middle-ground “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities” 
approach offers a potential solution to this transparency problem by diverting the 
9  David Leonhardt, “The American Middle Class No Longer the World’s Richest.”  New York 
Times , April 14, 2014. 
10  This includes support among some Republicans for minimum wage increases, at least at the state 
level (Reid J. Epstein, “Some Republicans Back State Minimum-Wage Increases.”  Wall Street 
Journal , September 15, 2014), and enhancements of the earned income tax credit (e.g., Reihan 
Salam, “The Battle of EITC Ideas,”  National Review Online, March 28, 2014). On the new mean-
ings of compassionate conservatism, see Thomas Edsall, “The Republic Discovery of the Poor,” 
 New York Times , February 11, 2015. 
12 Political and Policy Responses to Problems of Inequality and Opportunity…
432
emphasis from equalizing outcomes and redirecting it to equalizing opportunities 
without losing sight of either objective. Again, such a solution was well underway 
before the Occupy Wall Street movement got off the ground, underscoring its root-
edness in local conditions and political orientations. Beginning in the 2000s, for 
instance, several states passed measures to raise  taxes on high-income households 
in order to fund popular services, such as education, health care, and public safety. 
The measures often incorporated an explicit tradeoff between raising taxes—only 
on the affl uent—and funding opportunity-enhancing programs. 
 In early 2010, to take one example, voters passed a highly contested ballot mea-
sure in Oregon by a 54 % majority that, according to the offi cial summary of the 
measure, would:
 Raise taxes on household income at and above $250,000 (and $125,000 for individual fi l-
ers). Reduce income taxes on unemployment benefi ts in 2009. Provide funds currently bud-
geted for education, health care, public safety, other services. 
 In a similar fashion, the state of California passed  Proposition 30 by a 55 % 
majority in November 2012. The tradeoff was advertised in the very title of the 
proposition: “Temporary Taxes to Fund Education. Guaranteed Local Public Safety 
Funding. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.” The temporary nature of the tax 
hike may be as important as the commitment to funding opportunity-enhancing 
policies. A similar ballot measure failed in Washington state in part because, it is 
speculated, the measure left open the possibility that the legislature could vote in the 
future to increase taxes lower down in the income distribution (Franko et al.  2013 ). 
A later and more widely publicized example of an “equalize outcomes to equalize 
opportunities” approach came with  Bill de Blasio’s successful 2013 mayoral cam-
paign in New York City, the centerpiece of which was a promise to raise income 
taxes on the wealthy in order to fund universal preschool education. 11 
 Although these initiatives sound commonsensical, their novelty should not be 
underestimated. As far as I am aware, electoral campaigns in recent political history 
have advocated for progressive taxes (with reticence), and they have advocated for 
educational reforms (with gusto), but they have not advocated forthrightly for a 
progressive tax that would be targeted both in terms of who pays it (the affl uent) and 
which programs benefi t from it (education). In a more scholarly vein, educational 
programs have tended to fall outside the purview of conventional welfare state 
research and the corresponding “equal outcomes” approach, which focus on trans-
fers of income to fund safety net programs. 12 Nonetheless, education is emerging as 
11  It may be argued that these are liberal states, but each also has a history of electing Republican 
governors and/or passing conservative ballot measures. Young and Varner ( 2011 ) provide an anal-
ysis of the impact of so-called “millionaire” taxes on the outmigration of millionaires and fi nd little 
support for the pattern. 
12  In fact, public funding of higher education in particular has been seen as inequality enhancing 
(Ansell  2010 ). 
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a central theme in the everyday politics of redistribution as well as in contemporary 
research. 13 
 Moreover, in some prominent instances, a general call for shoring up educational 
resources is giving way to a more specifi c emphasis on creating a more equal edu-
cational starting gate for children from diverging socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Here, politicians are seizing on an academic argument about the negative relation-
ship between income inequality and intergenerational mobility, famously referred 
to as the  Great Gatsby Curve by President Obama’s former chief of economic advi-
sors,  Alan Krueger (Krueger  2012 ). In the fi nal section, I will discuss the potential 
of this strategy further and the scholarly evidence underlying it. 
 Another emerging prong of the “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities” 
approach concerns employment rather than educational opportunities. It too has 
been missing from the dominant models of  income redistribution because its empha-
sis is on redistribution in the labor market rather than on redistribution “after the 
fact” in post-transfer and post-tax income. 14  Labor market redistribution simply 
refers to any action that reduces disparities in pay and earnings in the labor market. 
Momentum has been building over many years to lift wages at the bottom, for 
instance, through popular and successful campaigns to raise the minimum wage at 
the local and state levels, sometimes to a living wage standard. Indeed, in the 2014 
midterm elections, one of the most remarked-upon patterns was the simultaneous 
election of Republican candidates on the one hand and passage of minimum wage 
increases on the other. 15 Some other notable developments to augment worker pay 
and facilitate access to good jobs include fast-food worker strikes and anti-wage- 
theft, anti-deunionization, anti-Walmart, ban-the-box and paid family leave cam-
paigns; these mostly have occurred at the local and state levels, a theme that 
characterizes the drive for greater and more equitable spending on education as well 
(Ingram et al.  2010 ; Bernhardt  2012 ; Milkman and Appelbaum  2013 ). 
 Finally, in an era of soaring top-end pay and stock market returns, and keeping in 
mind the public’s desire for radically reduced executive pay, there is the alternative 
strategy of reducing earnings at the top in the hopes of redistributing the proceeds 
to the middle and bottom. The most far-reaching examples in recent years come 
from overseas: the European Union’s 2013 rule to cap banker bonuses at two times 
salary levels and a binding say-on-executive-pay referendum applying to publicly 
13  For example, Ansell  2010 ; Busemeyer  2012 . In research with Lane Kenworthy (McCall and 
Kenworthy  2009 ), we show that most traditional redistributive policies that tax and transfer income 
have not risen in support relative to 1987, controlling for a wide range of factors. By contrast, the 
only policy that has enjoyed consistent support over time is increased spending on education. 
Moreover, this issue is now signifi cantly tied to beliefs about inequality, whereas it was not at the 
beginning of the period in 1987. If we look further back than 1987, we fi nd an even more striking 
increase in support for educational spending over time. 
14  Again, see McCall and Kenworthy ( 2009 , 460, 470–472) and McCall ( 2013 , Chap. 5). 
15  For instance, in Alaska (69 %), Arkansas (65 %), Nebraska (59 %), South Dakota (53 %), and 
Illinois (68 %), where the measure was advisory. In January 2015, 26 states will have higher mini-
mum wages than the federal level. Several Republican candidates are backing higher minimum 
wages if initiated at the state level but are opposed to a higher federal level. 
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held companies in Switzerland. The latter was launched in 2008 as a response to 
excessive executive pay packages at major corporations such as Novartis and was 
passed by a comfortable margin in 2013. Similar proposals have been fl oated in 
Germany and France. Although far weaker and less publicized, the  Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 did mandate and fi nally implement the disclosure 
of executive pay and executive-to-median pay ratios in publicly held companies. In 
each of these cases, employers mounted major opposition to the proposed laws and 
then to the regulatory bodies that oversee their implementation. 
 Importantly, however, some efforts to curb inequality have emanated from the 
corporate sector itself. Though still a relatively small-scale movement, a group of 
entrepreneurs is promoting the establishment of  B-Corporations , which challenge 
the primacy of shareholder value as the sole responsibility of the corporation and 
place social as well as profi t motives at the heart of their corporate charters. 
Similarly, the corporate social responsibility movement has been active for decades 
around issues such as ecological sustainability and equal employment opportunity 
but is now beginning to organize around the problem of pay inequality. More gener-
ally, what is emerging here are various ways to reintroduce “equity norms” directly 
into an increasingly dominant institution of contemporary society: the corporation 
(Edmans  2012 ; King and Pearce  2010 ). These and other efforts are coalescing 
around the new concept of “inclusive capitalism” (Freeland  2014a ; Summers and 
Balls  2015 ). 
 In sum, although the popular backlash against executive pay may ultimately lead 
to unintended and counterproductive consequences—such as higher banker base 
salaries or even executive pay—and may not therefore be ideal from an economist’s 
perspective, the broader lesson for our purposes is that the political and policy 
response to rising inequality and declining opportunities has been extended outside 
the traditional bounds of redistributive politics. The objective in many instances is 
to intervene in the pay-setting process itself. In this respect, advocates are following 
in the footsteps of the civil rights movement’s crusade against pay and employment 
discrimination. The current thrust—to reduce economic inequality as a path to 
enhanced labor market opportunities—is almost directly analogous to the historic 
and ongoing fi ght to reduce racial and gender earnings inequalities as an equal 
employment opportunity strategy. Both initiatives are forced by circumstances into 
an “equalize outcomes to equalize opportunities” approach, with an eye trained fi rst 
and foremost on the prize of equal opportunity. 
 The Future Politics of Inequality and Opportunity 
 As political scientists have long observed,  American public opinion is best under-
stood through the lens of pragmatism rather than ideology (Free and Cantril  1967 ; 
Walsh  2012 ; Bartels  2013 ). In that spirit, I have examined the politics of inequality 
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and opportunity from the point of view of the American public at large, as told 
through public opinion surveys, media coverage, and the fashioning of new political 
opportunities, primarily but not exclusively at the local and state levels. What has 
emerged from this examination is a portrait of a politics in formation, one that con-
forms to neither of the two dominant political traditions in this country concerning 
the contentious issue of inequality. 
 To be sure, both the “equal opportunities” and “equal outcomes” approaches will 
continue to have an enduring grip on the American mind, but they also fall short in 
crucial respects. The former’s prioritizing of economic opportunity—principally 
through the rhetoric of educational reform and economic growth—aligns with the 
public’s clear preference for this route to achieving a fair and equitable society, but 
it does so at the cost of misrecognizing the role that economic inequality now plays 
in restricting opportunities for economic security and upward mobility. As a result, 
the latter “equal outcomes” approach strikes a chord with the American public, too, 
as most want to see a reversal of the growing divide in outcomes, and have for at 
least the past quarter of a century. The problem with this approach, however, is that 
income redistribution is too often portrayed as an end in itself, or alternatively, as a 
source of tax revenues for a diffuse set of social and public goods. Yet Americans 
appear to be less agitated by the absolute scale of inequality as such than by the 
consequences of inequality for their prospects of earning a good living. In short, 
neither approach connects the problem of inequality to the problem of opportunity. 
 Into this vacuum step a variety of initiatives that I have grouped under the “equal-
ize outcomes to equalize opportunities” banner, whose lineage can be traced back to 
the civil rights movement. These initiatives fall into one of two categories. In the 
fi rst, the focus is on the skewed pattern of economic growth and, specifi cally, the 
need to redistribute earnings in the labor market in order to lift absolute living stan-
dards at the bottom and middle of the distribution. In the second, the focus is on the 
shift from generic taxing and spending models of redistribution to “taxing for 
opportunity” models that explicitly target educational opportunity as one of the cen-
tral goals. Owing to the pragmatic origins of these initiatives, however, they have 
thus far been launched in a piecemeal and inchoate fashion. Does the future promise 
something more bold and holistic? Building on the discussion in the previous sec-
tions, I conclude with a guiding principle upon which to orient future conversations 
and then offer two specifi c directions for further action. 
 First, the foregoing discussion suggests an absence of political and economic 
innovation and leadership as the primary obstacle to reducing inequality and 
expanding opportunity, not public views or public ignorance. The politics and eco-
nomics of these issues are not by any means straightforward or confl ict free, but, 
with public support, they can reach beyond conventional strategies. I have purpose-
fully presented examples of how this is already happening in which the  majority of 
the public is on board, as expressed in public opinion surveys, votes cast for local 
and statewide referenda, or media coverage across the political spectrum. 
 This is not to deny the worrisome polarization in political views that is often seen 
as the most serious obstacle to progress. But it is a reminder that the evidence 
on  polarization among the public—as opposed to among politicians—is far from 
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conclusive and is, more importantly for our purposes, often dependent on the issue 
at hand. 16 This is why it is necessary to train our attention on particular issues and to 
recognize the other form of polarization—between the policy views of economic 
elites and those of the public at large—as of perhaps equal consequence. Indeed, 
one of the most signifi cant advances of late in political science research is the iden-
tifi cation of a “representation gap,” in which the policy views of economic elites 
disproportionately infl uence the ultimate passage of legislation. In order for this to 
occur, there must fi rst be differences in preferences by income, and it’s these differ-
ences that are often at the heart of debates over reducing inequality and expanding 
opportunity. 17 
 Second, with this guiding principle in mind, I suggest two possible avenues for 
future action; each would enjoy public backing and signifi cantly advance the 
prospects for holistic and effective change. In keeping with the two-pronged 
nature of current initiatives, one focuses more directly on expanding and equal-
izing educational opportunities and the other on doing so for employment 
opportunities. 
 Regarding the former, in a somewhat ironic turn of events, the cutting edge of 
policy innovation in Europe has taken a noteworthy shift in recent years from an 
outcomes-based agenda to an opportunity-based one, tying the two objectives more 
explicitly together than in the past. In contrast to the broadly redistributive thrust of 
traditional welfare state policies, the new so-called  “social investment” strategies 
seek fi rst and foremost to harness the  human capital potential of the entire popula-
tion, regardless of social background or stage over the course of life. This involves, 
among other things, the development of programs to educate children from disad-
vantaged backgrounds, retrain unemployed and displaced adult workers for gainful 
employment, and smooth the transition from home care to paid work for family 
caretakers. Crucially, such strategies also include “wage progression” or “intragen-
erational” wage mobility targets for low-income adults and not just educational ini-
tiatives for low-income children (see Chap.  13 ; also Morel et al.  2012 ; Larsen  2013 ; 
Reeves  2014 ). 
16  For instance, with respect to views about the economy and views about inequality, I fi nd far more 
partisan polarization about the former than about the latter (McCall  2013 , 172–74). 
17  Gilens  2012 ; Gilens and Page  2014 . Note that Gilens ( 2012 ) shows that there are differences in 
representation only when there are differences in opinion, which do not occur on every issue. The 
Appendix provides a list of differences in policy preferences on economic and educational issues 
between the top 1 % and the general public, as well as some areas of agreement, particularly on 
education, taken from Page et al. ( 2013 ). 
 In addition to the representation gap by income, Solt ( 2010 ) fi nds that turnout in gubernatorial 
elections is lower in states with higher inequality, and that the overrepresentation of high-income 
voters relative to low-income voters is greater as well. And a number of scholars have noted the 
declining presence of powerful organizations that can lobby on behalf of middle-income and low-
income interests (Skocpol  2003 ; Strolovitch  2007 ; Hacker and Pierson  2010 ; Gilens  2012 ). 
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 In one way or another, the aim of these policies is to eliminate the  transmission 
of “class” advantage and disadvantage from one generation to the next. Though 
long a goal of social democracy, it also resembles an attempt to shore up the 
American-style dream, so that achievement is more dependent on individual effort 
than on family income and cultural capital. That Europe should be leading the 
charge in this respect, and that it should be the region with lower levels of inequality 
 and higher rates of social mobility, is eye opening. Although recent evidence in the 
U.S. suggests that  intergenerational mobility has not, in fact, declined alongside the 
increase in income inequality, the longer distance to travel from bottom to top has 
no doubt made upward strides more formidable (Bloome  2014 ; Chetty et al.  2014 ). 
In contrast to conventional wisdom, Americans grasp this reality: They are at least 
as likely to recognize the unfair infl uence of social factors in getting ahead as 
Europeans, and their faith in the ability of hard work to prevail has been falling 
steadily over the past decade. Thus restoring opportunity in America, in an expan-
sive way, would have wide appeal. 
 This is where the second avenue of future action comes into play. It entails the 
involvement, indeed  partnership, of the business community , which has “evolved 
to be the dominant social institution of our age … and yet has fallen short in its 
potential to serve global society” (Blount  2014 ; Freeland  2014b ). Above, I 
described several attempts to intervene in the labor market itself: to reduce execu-
tive pay, increase minimum wages, and the like. But, arguably, these only scratch 
the surface. Recalibrating pay incentives and reintroducing equity norms and a 
more “ inclusive capitalism ” throughout the economy is perhaps the most daunting 
challenge lying ahead. Political rhetoric far exceeds concrete action, and our com-
prehension of exactly  how (or even whether) corporations can help to restore 
opportunity in America, in a meaningful way, is extremely limited (Freeland 
 2014a ; also see Chaps.  6 and  10 in this volume; Blasi et al.  2013 ; Summers and 
Balls  2015 ). 
 Yet we can rely once again on public wisdom to motivate the charge. In prelimi-
nary research, my colleagues and I conducted surveys in 2014 and 2015 of roughly 
1500 Americans on Amazon Mechanical Turk, a service that crowd sources to pro-
vide survey data. 18 We asked respondents a forced choice question about who has 
the greatest responsibility for reducing income differences: low-income individuals 
themselves, private charities, high-income individuals themselves, government, or 
18  These come from survey experiments and new survey questions that I am developing with a 
number of collaborators in the U.S. (Jennifer Richeson, Department of Psychology, Northwestern 
University) and abroad (Jonus Edlund and Arvid Lindh, Department of Sociology, Umea 
University, Sweden). The results are broken down by partisanship because the mTurk data are not 
representative. Nonetheless, for related questions that we adapted from the GSS, we found that the 
results from the mTurk survey are comparable to those from the GSS in the case of Republicans, 
and not too far off for Independents. Thus we can get a reasonable estimate from the mTurk data 
of how the public views the role of major companies in reducing pay disparities. 
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major companies. Respondents could also select an option at the end indicating that 
income differences do not need to be reduced. Except for this last option, the 
response categories were randomly ordered across respondents. 
 What we found is that only 21 % of Republicans and 9 % of Independents say 
that inequality does not need to be reduced, and for both Republicans and 
Independents, major companies were viewed as having the greatest responsibility 
for reducing inequality (33 % of Republicans and 35 % of Independents). Another 
33 % of Independents chose government as the most responsible, for a total of 68 % 
who placed responsibility at the feet of either government or business. For 
Republicans, the total came in just shy of 50 % (15 % selected government for a 
total of 48 %). Despite the fact that only 15 % of Republicans selected government 
as having the most responsibility, however, we suspect that respondents of all politi-
cal hues would support government regulation of business as part of what is neces-
sary to coax major companies into the conversation over reducing inequality and 
expanding opportunity (see the uneven but notably high levels of support of govern-
ment regulation of business by the general public under some circumstances, pro-
vided in the  Appendix , and also Lipset and Schneider  1987 ). Finally, the majority 
of Democrats selected government as the most responsible (54 %), but, surprisingly, 
over a quarter selected major companies (28 %). Although trust in both government 
and business institutions has fallen precipitously in the past decade, most Americans 
still look to them for leadership. 19 
 Conclusion 
 The way forward, in sum, is to eschew a one-sided focus on  either equal outcomes 
 or equal opportunities; to harness the resources and competitive advantages of all 
major institutions in society, from government, to education, to business; and to 
build on the pragmatic consensus of local initiatives to forge a national commitment 
to ensure that our future is as lofty and inclusive in reality as it is in our dreams. 
19  Data on trust in business, fi nance and banks, and government can be found here: “Following the 
Public on Inequality: IPR Sociologist’s Book Scrutinizes U.S. Beliefs on Inequality,” posting on 










 % general 
public 
favors 
 Jobs and pay 
  Minimum wage high enough so that no family with a full-time 
worker falls below offi cial poverty line 
 43 %  78 % 
  The government in Washington ought to see to it that everyone 
who wants to work can fi nd a job 
 19 %  68 % 
  The federal government should provide jobs for everyone able and 
willing to work who cannot fi nd a job in private employment 
 8 %  53 % 
 Economic regulation and macroeconomic policy 
  The government has an essential role to play in regulating the 
market 
 55 %  71 % 
  Would like to live in a society where the government does nothing 
except provide national defense and police protection, so that 
people would be left alone to earn whatever they could 
 19 %  27 % 
  The federal government has gone too far in regulating business and 
interfering with the free enterprise system 
 69 %  65 % 
  The following need more [minus less] federal government 
regulation [“about the same as now” omitted]: 
  Wall Street fi rms  +18  +45 
  Oil industry  +6  +50 
  Health insurance industry  +4  +26 
  Big corporations  −20  +33 
  Small business  −70  −42 
  The government should run a defi cit if necessary when the country 
is in a recession and is at war [vs. The government should balance 
the budget even when the country is in a recession and is at war] 
 73 %  31 % 
 Favor cuts in spending on domestic programs like Medicare, 
education, and highways in order to cut federal budget defi cits 
 58 %  27 % 
  Willing to pay more taxes in order to reduce federal budget defi cits  65 %  34 % 
 Education 
  The federal government should make sure that everyone who wants 
to go to college can do so 
 28 %  78 % 
  The federal government should spend whatever is necessary to 
ensure that all children have really good public schools they can go 
to 
 35 %  87 % 
  The federal government should invest more in worker retraining 
and education to help workers adapt to changes in the economy 
[vs. Such efforts just create big government programs that do not 
work very well] 
 30 %  50 % 
 Source: Page et al. ( 2013 , Tables 5, 7, and 8) 
 Note: Several areas of agreement on education policy include paying more taxes for early child-
hood education, the idea of merit pay for teachers, charter schools, tax-funded vouchers for private 
schools 
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